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The philosophy of language and the Ontology of Knowledge  
Jean-Louis Boucon  
  
  
Objective   
 
The relations between thought and reality are studied in many fields of philosophy and 
science. Examples include ontology and metaphysics in general, linguistics, neuroscience and 
even mathematics.  
Each one has its postulates, its language, its methods and its own constraints. It would be 
unreasonable, however, for them to ignore each other.  
In the pages that follow we will try to identify areas of proximity between the ideas of 
contemporary philosophers of language and those issued mainly by Ontology of 
Knowledge (see below) but also by mathematics and neuroscience.  
We will try to take advantage of the clarity and the perfect structuring of the lecture « La 
philosophie contemporaine du langage » (the contemporary philosophy of language) given by 
Professor Denis Vernant (see below). We will make use of this lecture, both for the ideas 
presented and as a reference process.  
The goal of this article is to bring out, through a benevolent confrontation, new ideas for the 
benefit of knowledge in general.  
  
 
 
  
Introduction to the contemporary philosophy of language .  
              The content of the lecture written by Professor Denis Vernant (Univ. Pierre Mendes-
France-Grenoble II) is included in the book (ref.1).  
The objective is very clearly stated in the preamble, so let's just reproduce it here.  
              "The objective of this lecture is to introduce the student to a fundamental aspect of 
contemporary thinking: the reflection on language and meaning. The central question of 
meaning is successively studied under its syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects by 
appealing to all the contemporary fields of knowledge in the matter: logic, linguistics, 
semiotics, philosophy of language."  
              After a brief return to the Greek origins of the question, Professor Vernant offers us, 
in a text of absolute clarity, a comprehensive and structured overview of reflections since the 
dawn of the 20th century.  
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Ontology of Knowledge.  
            Ontology of Knowledge (OK) is an ontological theory.  
It has already been the subject of a book (ref 2) and dozens of articles on my blog.  
It is not possible to give here, neither a detailed description nor a justification. We will thus 
limit ourselves to the key elements of OK that are useful to the article.  
  
Key Elements of Ontology of Knowledge  
▪ The OK is based on 3 premises   :  
- A meta-ontological judgment   :  
                      - The Cogito proves itself. It proves nothing more than a simple “I”  
- Two postulates :       
- There is something else besides this “I” (the Reality)  
- There is Interdependence between the "I" and the Reality  
  
▪ Of these 3 premises the OK deduces the following main principles   :  
- At least Interdependence is a reality, this may be the only ontological element necessary.  
- The Reality is a system of interdependencies  
- The Reality has no form.  
- There are no beings in reality but only in its representation.  
- The Reality knows itself (it represents itself)  
- Knowledge is not of another reality than the Reality. However OK is not a form of 
materialism.  
- A Knowledge is an abundant and motionless course of Interdependencies that link the 
thought (the “I” as a point of view) to the Reality  
- The form results of the mathematical principles which rule this course.  
- All Knowledge is relative to the point of view  
- Since it is not subject to form, the Reality is not subject to change.  
- Knowledge can not make sense in itself, only a wider Knowledge that comprehends it can 
give it meaning. A Knowledge can therefore only exist by and in its extension.  
- This principle is the Anima, the cause of subjective time, the cause of the becoming 
experienced by the knowing subject. Anima is what animates the Representation, the thought.  
- This principle also imposes an essential difference between "what includes” and « what is 
included". This asymmetric relation fits the representation with a principle of order, an arrow 
that will make it possible to order spaces there.  
- The meaning of a Knowledge lies in the laws of probability that link this Knowledge to its 
possible extensions (to future experiences).  
- For the knowing subject the meaning of his representation is limited by a logical horizon 
with indefinite contours, limit where everything seems to him to be “named”. On this horizon 
the knowing subject represents his Universe.   
- The Universe is what the subject comprehends, the meaning of his knowledge.  
- The Reality is unfounded, there is no primary element, no primary substance and everything 
can always be infinitely detailed. All Knowledge is infinitely decomposable.  
- The knowing subject cannot change anything to the Reality that is immutable, but it can 
change the course of extension of his Knowledge.  
- The unity of the knowing subject results from a principle of agglomeration of the meaning 
close to the principle of individuation described by G. Simondon (ref 3). This principle can as 
well be called the Logos.  
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Development:  
  
Ferdinand de Saussure postulated (ref 1) that " there can be no thought without language " 
and that "without its expression by words, our thought is only an amorphous and indistinct 
mass (...) taken in itself thought is like a nebula where nothing is necessarily delimited ...   "  
By this postulate De Saussure refused to the thought any prevalence on language. He also 
showed that there can be no thought without language.  
The word was not, in his opinion, a mere arbitrary label attached to a concept, but involved, at 
least, the structuring of thought into interdependent entities.  
From this postulate follows the importance, for the thought, of the language, the words and 
the signs of which we must specify the nature.  
It also follows that there can be no thought without forms.  
 
So here is a point of intersection between philosophy of language and ontology. If thought 
and language are inseparable, can the representation of reality (ontology) and the constitution 
of language enlighten / justify / deepen one another?  
 
Let's start with the Stoics who proposed a tripartite definition of the sign according to the 
figure below (applied to the sound sign).  
 
This trinity (object in reference, meaning, sound), although it may seem natural, quickly came 
up against ontological questions about the nature of the object in reference and its relation to 
the concept.  
How, indeed, could the object vis-à-vis be considered as referent if we know nothing of its 
shape, its essence, its substance?  
Considering this ignorance, the reference of meaning to the object vis-à-vis can only be a self- 
reference.  
The long-standing split of the relationship between the object and the meaning was consumed 
by Kant's publication of his “Critique de la raison pure” (Ref 4).  
De Saussure decided, with regard to linguistics at least, to exclude the referent from his 
model. The sign is no longer something that is worth something else, it no longer unites a 
thing and a name but a concept and an acoustic image (according to the image below)  
 
  The acoustic image is not here the physical phenomenon but the psychic imprint of the 
sound; what makes the sign a purely psychic unity unifying two poles, two elements   : 
signifier and signified.  
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NB (we use the words Signifier and Signified rather than Meaning and Meant, because 
meaning has a specific use in OK  
Although specific to sound language, this scheme could apply to colors, shapes, smells, etc.  
A first suggestion of the OK would be to focus our attention on that part of the thought and 
language that represents the world. Can we not say that the psychic imprints of sound, form, 
color, touch, etc. are nothing but sensations?   ?  
The diagram above, limited to the representation of the world would become this one   :  
 
  
This schema would make it possible to envisage the representation of the world by the 
thought as a perceived language. The sign appears as One/separated sensation among all 
sensations and associated with an element of significance, a concept.  
One can exclude any formal reference of the sign/representation to an object opposite, as de 
Saussure did for the sign/language in its first definition.  
For the subject who represents it, things are like the words of nature.  
  
De Saussure shows that the interdependence between being and sensation is reciprocal.  
With the sensation the being (the concept) makes itself speakable/expressible/representable to 
the thought, the thought takes forms and expresses its significance through sensations.  
  
  
The question of referencing  
  
As for the representation of the world, to renounce without recourse to any reference in the 
Reality is not satisfactory, except to take refuge in a pure solipsism.  
The OK can also help to relieve this discomfort.  
  
First of all, let us specify two reasons why the form of the object in vis-à-vis can not be used 
as a reference to the representation:  
1) Between the supposed object and the significance, there are already and only the sensations 
which are nothing more than a signifier and have no formal relation neither with the object 
nor with what is signified.  
-On this last point the philosophy of language brings us precious light:  
As far as the language is concerned, the relation of the signifier (word in its form) to the 
signified is arbitrary. The multiplicity of languages attests.  
However once the form of the signifier (the word) has been fixed by convention, the 
persistence of the relation of this word to the significance is necessary.  
As far as the representation of the world is concerned, the relation of the signifier (the 
sensation) to its significance (the predicate as the formal element of significance) is arbitrary, 
but once this relation has been fixed by evolution and learning the persistence of the relation 
of the sensation to the predicate is necessary.  
-The relation between sensation and predicate gives us the opportunity to distinguish two 
aspects of the thought that will be of much use in the pages to come:  
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The thought/subject would be, in principle, the way in which I represent my own thought. 
The 2 diagrams above proceed from the thought / subject  
The thought/object would be, in principle, the way in which I can represent the thought of 
another, as an external object, without however presupposing the material form. We find in 
this respect the neurological, logical, computer and other models.  
Without reducing the thought/subject to the thought/object, or to the bio-physical functioning 
of the brain, it is reasonable to think that they both share the same reality. In one way or 
another, behind the curtain of significance, as it appears to the thought/subject lies the 
complexity (precisely unthinkable) of the thought/object.  
While considering the apparent logic of thought/subject , we can not ignore the chaotic 
structure of thought/object.  
  
Thus, considered from the angle of thought/object, the sensation as well as the concept of an 
object are physically diffuse, in space and time, in the sense that it would be impossible to 
isolate them from the rest of thought by a "cut".  
The sign/object does not exist the same way as a thing exists  
The sign/object is nothing precise. 
Never the sensation, nor the concept of the thought/subject have the "form” of the sign/object, 
in no way.  
The physical phenomenon of sensation has no formal relation with the sign (with any of its 
possible attributes). Who can believe that bioelectric signals convey a "form"?  
It is even impossible to isolate strictly the system of inferences (a  b) that would define the 
sign/object as a logical entity, even if we could separate the spatiotemporal (physical) 
relationship from the causal relation (purely logical).  
It is therefore clear that the sensation/subject (e.g. a perceived colour or sound) has no formal 
relation to the Reality. To refer to the object per se to justify the sensation of the object can 
only be self-reference.  
  
2) If the concept referred only to the existent, or to the supposed existent, that is to the 
sensation, it would be of no use, it would not offer any existential advantage to the subject and 
this functionality of knowledge would have been long forgotten by evolution. What is the use 
of knowing what is necessarily passed?  
This question opens the gap through which the OK proposes to reduce the question of 
referencing.  
To find what the sign could refer to, while retaining the autonomy of the representation vis-à-
vis the form of reality, let’s call on Darwin and ask the question "in what way is the 
representation of the real and the language an advantage for the subject?"  
  
The proposed answer is a bit technical, but it's worth the effort   :  
As a preamble, let us see the complexity of the sign/object (concept and sensation) hidden 
under the apparent semantic simplicity of the sign/subject.  
To evaluate the complexity of language and thought as logical systems, it is sufficient to 
depict them at the atomic level. How many billions of logical inferences are necessary to the 
slightest sensation, to the simple proposition “this is red” considered as an element of 
language as well as a representation?  
In the thought/object nothing allows to cut a sensation from all the others, nor even from the 
concepts. This interdependence is precisely the power of thought. The thought/object is a 
relational chaos, as well as its relation to the real.  
Relational chaos present attractors, entities that persist for vast domains of initial conditions. 
These domains of persistence are continuities.  
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A course of Knowledge is random, but the laws of large numbers impose continuities, the 
persistence of units.  
The increase of a Knowledge presents continuities (Knowledge develops towards infinity of 
directions and yet remains a Unity).  
  
Here appears the Darwinian benefit of representation   :  
Because of its underlying chaotic nature, the expansion of Knowledge presents continuities. 
The new sensations are not independent of the current state of Knowledge.  
A state of sensations carries in itself singular laws of probabilities on other sensations. Some 
possible future sensations are more likely than others.  
The reality of meaning is the existence of these singular laws of probability, of an 
interdependence between a sensation and those which will follow. These continuities make 
possible conjectures on future Knowledge based on the current Knowledge.  
Thus, the sign “Socrates” makes sense by the conjecture of the next sensations of “old”, 
“wise”, “ugly”, “generous” ... and also the sign "red” associated with the sign “apple" makes 
sense by the conjecture of the next sensations of “sweet”, “tender”, etc ...  
The raison d'être of meaning is that it anticipates efficiently future sensations, future increases 
in Knowledge of the subject.  
This phenomenon is reinforced by itself because the semantic anticipation of a future 
sensation increases the probability of its realization.  
It is remarkable that the sense as defined here refers to Knowledge itself and in no way to a 
form per se of the Real, to which it is enough just to be chaotic, to have no form in reality. 
What does it matter that there is no Socrates/object having in reality the formal attributes of 
“old age”, “ugliness”, “wisdom” and “generosity”, what does it matter that an apple is not 
“red” in reality, what matters is the persistence of specific probability links between a state of 
Knowledge and the following.  
The form is the persistence of this semantic attractor, of this loop of probabilities which unites 
the sign to its semantic neighbourhood, it is the label (the symbol ?) of the conjecture that can 
be drawn from it. It is the meta-knowledge of the meaning of a Knowledge.  
We note that, just as for the signifier of language, the form (the formal label) attached to the 
concept is arbitrary. Just as the acoustic image associated with the concept of Socrates is 
arbitrary, the formal label associated with the concept of red is arbitrary, only matters the 
efficiency of the conjectures, the persistence of the singular relations of probability, in their 
individual and relative truth.  
Let us understand well; we have just shown that the hypothesis of a form of the world is not 
necessary. The Reality could well be shapeless; the forms that the Logos (as a statistical 
principle) gives to it are sufficiently invariant to make predictable and therefore ascertainable 
the increase of my Knowledge.  
  
There are many examples that illustrate this definition of referencing   :  
-The meaning that we mentally associate with the concept of an object is the expectation of 
sensations probably associated with the future experience of this object.  
-The meaning of a word is precisely the expectation of the sensations that a voice will give us 
pronouncing this word.  
-The orientation of the dance of the bees is for us, relative to the position of the sun, while the 
bees have in no way formal knowledge of the existence of the sun, its position, or its 
trajectory. They just expect that flying so long and so much right from the light they will find 
pollen to collect.  
-Poincaré writes in his book “La science et l’hypothèse" Page 80 (ref 5) “When we say that 
we “localize” such object in this point of space, what does it mean ?  
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It simply means that we represent to ourselves the movements that must be done to reach this 
object ; and don’t tell me that to represent these movements, we must project them into space 
and that the notion of space must, therefore, pre-exist.  
When I say that we represent these movements to ourselves, I mean only that we represent to 
ourselves the muscular sensations which accompany them and which have no geometrical 
character and which, consequently, do not imply the pre-existence of the notion of space"  
For Poincaré, the concept of space has no reference either to a formal reality vis-à-vis, or to a 
geometric a priori intuition but to the conjecture of future sensations.  
 
Conclusion on referencing:  
Using the question of referencing as an intersection between linguistics and ontology, we 
have identified 2 reciprocal contributions:  
On the one hand, the approach according to the OK allowed us to define for the sign (image / 
concept) a mode of referencing independent of any form a priori of an object vis-à-vis.  
The meaning of a sign (of a sensation, an image), refers to the law of probability that it 
determines on other signs (sensations, images)  
On the other hand, the parallel between the concept-to-word relation in the linguistic sign and 
the concept-to-form relation in the representation of a being has shown us that the form 
associated with the concept of being is essentially arbitrary and that only are relevant the 
conjectures it makes possible.  
  
The question of the present moment .  
  
The definition of the sign (signifier / signified) contains in itself an apparent paradox:  
The meaning of the sign appears as One and present to the thought/subject,  
The all world appears present to the thought/subject  
The subject appears to himself as One and present.  
And yet, the signs turn out to be complex at the very moment they appear to the subject, as we 
have shown with the example of Socrates.  
Indeed:  
At the level of the thought/subject: Within linguistic signs, every concept is necessarily 
associated with a signifier, but the signifiers can not associate without a syntax which, again, 
implies succession (ex.: red apple, twenty-one).  
At the level of the thought/object: The sensation as well as the concept of an object are diffuse 
sets, whatever their nature. They can not be unified in a sign without a certain temporal 
thickness. An acoustic image, for example, assumes time.  
How can it be that despite these contrary evidences the sign appears One and present to the 
thought/subject   ?  
  
To understand this we must first figure out how the meaning unites what is diffuse.  
Having acquired that the meaning is a law of probability on future experiences, the example 
of the referendum below illustrates this process of unification by the meaning quite well.:  
The population solicited by a referendum carries with it an Opinion that is diffuse in time and 
space. No individual carries with himself the sense of the Opinion. There is in reality no state 
of Opinion. An opinion poll, however, will produce the unitary sense the Opinion through a 
conjecture about the outcome of a future event.  
The relation (the law of probability) between the diffuse whole and its possible developments 
unifies the meaning. The innumerable reality of the signifier is replaced by a conjecture on a 
countable set of future experiences. It is the same for the pressure or the temperature of a gas.  
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The unity of the meaning of a sign must not be sought in its diffuse reality (informal) but in 
the conjecture it authorizes.  
This unifying principle of meaning does not suddenly and completely transform the 
thought/object into the thought/subject, it must be considered as an extended and permanent 
flux of unification whose asymptotic target will be the Cartesian “I”, always repulsed by the 
very principle that generates it.  
This principle of unification of the “I” is to be compared with the principle of individuation 
developed by G. Simondon. (ref 3 )  
  
This principle, by which the sign appears One to the thought/subject, also makes us glimpse 
how the sign seems present to the thought/subject, more precisely: synchronous in the present 
moment.  
  
The sign is never synchronous in reality (as an object) because, being necessarily complex, it 
could not be One and synchronous at the same moment.  
Since Einstein indeed, we know that in the world as we represent it, the world that common 
sense still calls reality, the concept of simultaneity of entities separated according to the form 
of space is undefined; it does not correspond to anything of real.  
So a "state of mind" can only mean for the thought/subject and not for the thought/object.  
The present moment is only defined for the thought/subject, for the "I”; for this semantic 
asymptote where all meanings coincide.  
If the sign, as an object (which is never really synchronous) appears to be present to the 
subject, it is simply because the present moment of the subject is his state of mind.  
When de Saussure decided to exclude the form opposite as a reference for the sign, he should 
also have excluded the present moment as a reference.  
The present moment of the sign, is not an external reference but it is included in its concept, 
in the concept of each sign and it is the semantic interdependence of the concepts that causes 
the convergence * of all these present moments to a present moment for the knowing subject, 
for the " I ".  
Every concept includes a present moment that is only valid for this concept.  
We must not then consider the “I” as located in a present time that would be vis-à-vis him, but 
on the contrary consider the present moment as constitutive of the "I”, as immanent to the "I".  
The idea of present moment is already included in the “I” of the Cogito.  
* The term "convergence” is misleading here because the interdependencies between concepts 
are reciprocal. The impression of convergence is only a question of perspective. On the other 
hand, convergence is purely semantic; it combines laws of probability whereas at the level of 
thought/object nothing changes.  
  
The synchronicity of the language representation results from the very nature of what we call 
the state of mind of the subject: the senses of the signs (considered as containers, logical 
attractors for the thought) are progressively subsumed towards this purely semantic whole 
which is the representation of the world by the "I".  
At each stage of this semantic aggregation, the “compound” is not the combination of the 
shape of the “component” signs (Which would be absurd) but the circulation of 
interdependencies (laws of reciprocal probability).  
The present moment of the "compound" concept not formally refers to the present moments 
of the "components" concepts.  
There is not a present time which would bathe the fusion of the components into compound 
but creation, in the compound, of its own present moment.  
The "I” is ultimately the only one to know his present moment.  
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In reality, there is no synchronicity neither of signs/objects nor of thought/object, but the 
creation of a semantic present moment in the asymptote of the process of 
unification/individuation of the knowledge of the subject.  
  
This description  relates to the formal concept of present moment but it can be generalized to 
all the concepts of form.  
If it is for the subsumption of the thought/object by the thought/subject, it can also be 
extended upstream, to the passage from the supposed form of the object vis-à-vis to the 
sensation.  
The sensation is not a transposition of the form of the Real but the creation of predicates; and 
the concept of being is not the formal fusion of sensations but the creation of a semantic entity 
including a present moment for it.  
Each stage of unification of the knowledge of the world is creation of new forms and new 
present moments.  
This fully justifies de Saussure's refusal of any formal reference of the sign to the object in 
front of it.  
This also justifies this statement by Schopenhauer "The world is my representation", keystone 
of his ontological vision. (ref 6 )  
  
NB   It is essential to keep in mind that this principle of unification is semantic and not 
spatiotemporal, physical or material. Without this permanent effort to distinguish the 
thought/object from the thought/subject, which is the only one of which we are certain, all 
ontological reflection is lost in confusion and is finally digested anew by the theology of a 
world in vis-à-vis.  
The purely semantic nature of the principle of unification proposed by the OK distinguishes 
itself from the principle of individuation enunciated by G. Simondon (ref. 3 ) . While keeping 
the general idea that the knowing subject is individuation of the Knowledge, the OK allows a 
considerable reduction of the number of assumptions a priori necessary to its coherence.  
  
Conclusion on present moment: Thanks to the mode of referencing proposed by the OK, 
namely: a law of probability on other signs, we have been able to show that the unification of 
meaning creates not only the form but also a present moment for each concept, that the 
present moment of a concept is not the present moment of the concepts it unifies and by 
generalization, that the hypothesis of an actual present time experienced through sensation is 
wrong. 
Reciprocally, the analysis of the question of the present moment applied to the linguistic sign 
allowed us to show that there is no present moment in Reality, neither for the world in 
opposite nor for the thought/object and that the “I” is the focal point of the build up of a 
present moment. 
The “I”, the thought/subject is ultimately the only concept to represent the present moment of 
his representation of the world.  
To somehow paraphrase Schopenhauer: “The present moment of the world is the present 
moment of my representation” 
 
   
The Anima or the subject's time  
  
Having presented what is the present moment of the subject, we try, according to the same 
strategy of reciprocal illumination of the OK and the philosophy of language, to understand 
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what is perpetually pushing from one moment to another, the "I “ and his representation of the 
world.  
  
Schopenhauer having shown that: “the world is representation " and “All our representations 
are objects for the subject, and all the objects of the subject are our representations.”   
He writes: " The “I” which represents itself, the subject of knowledge can never become itself 
a representation or an object, because, as the necessary correlate of all representations, it is 
their very condition”. (He then quotes an Upanishad)   “He can not be seen; he sees 
everything; he can not be heard; he hears everything; he can not be known, he knows 
everything. Outside of this being who sees, who hears, who knows, there is no other being "  
This is why there is no knowledge of knowledge, because it would require that the subject 
differs from knowledge and can still know knowledge, which is impossible "  
  
(Ref 6) §41 p 275 276  
  
Strictly speaking, these juxtaposed sentences would present a paradox: If the world is what I 
know and if knowledge can not know itself, how could I talk about the world ?  
  
The resolution of this paradox lies in the fact that we, as knowing subjects, are not the great 
Self of the Upanishad, we do not know "all" but only "all we know” and see only “what we 
see”.  
This finitude of the knowing subject is, in fact, the greatest gift that nature may have given 
him, since it permits the flow of life.  
 
To understand this let's go back to the sign:  
The thought/subject is closely associated with the sign/subject (concept/form). We also know 
that the sign/object is a bottomless complexity.  
It follows that the representation of the world by the thought/subject can not reproduce all the 
detail of the thought/object.  
In comparison to the thought/object, the sought/subject is necessarily limited by a semantic 
horizon, a limit with indefinite contours beyond which it exhausts itself, everything already 
appearing to it as "named" by signs.  
If the thought/subject is blind to what is beyond its horizon; it is none the less interdependent 
of it.  
Knowledge is possibly an infinite course, possibly unfounded, but whose representation is 
limited by a horizon.  
The All of the representation is not the All of Knowledge which is perhaps not the All of the 
Real.  
The Knowledge of the subject is in an unknowable relation compared to all the Real.  
Knowledge is incommensurable with the All of the Real.  
  
As J. Schopenhauer writes (and as Goedel demonstrated for arithmetic), it is true that 
knowledge, as a closed logical system, could not justify its truth, could not represent itself. 
Only a larger logical system, that is, containing other propositions, could.  
But we have seen that knowledge is not a closed logical system, that representation is only 
limited by a horizon and that the meaning of the sign is a "law of probability on other signs". 
These other signs are what topology calls the (semantic) neighbourhood of which the sign is 
interdependent.  
Knowledge therefore takes on meaning for itself only as it repels its horizon, as the 
probabilities contained in each sign are confirmed “by” and "within" its neighbourhood.  
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The representation only makes sense as and when it increases; because the meaning is 
precisely the name of the persistence it can conjecture beyond its horizon.  
Knowledge (which is a course In act, a set of links) becomes "signs" only by its fusion with 
concepts through new acts, through its own logical extension, because it is in this extension 
that the conjectures become semantic persistence, signs of themselves.     
The sign contains in itself the law of probability of other acts, but exists (is stated) only by the 
occurrence of these other acts.  
Knowledge contains in itself the law of probability of persistence beyond its horizon, but 
exists (becomes a representation of itself) only by the unveiling of these persistence.  
This disclosure is irreversible, although the links of interdependence are reciprocal.  
  
The finitude of our representation of the world and of ourselves, on the one hand, and the 
need for knowledge to push back its horizon to make sense on the other, constitute the 
principle of the Anima, which animates the thought/subject, the soul of the subject.  
The present moment being, in essence, linked to the “I” of the thought/subject, the progressive 
unveiling of new signs is interpreted by the thought/subject as a change in the representation, 
as a time of the world, whereas it is a change of point of view.     
Note (and G. Simondon stressed it before us) that convergence or individuation is not a 
process of which the "I" would be the result; but it is the essence of the “I”, the same 
principle.  
The "I" is and always will be the asymptotic target of the slight unbalance between the 
expansion of the knowledge and the convergence of the meaning. It follows that the 
progressive unveiling, the change of point of view does not reveal another "I". Although it 
results from an expansion of itself the "I" always knows himself as "myself".  
  
In conclusion and in reply to Schopenhauer, the subject is not, for himself, an object of 
knowledge. Nevertheless, he exists to himself and gives meaning to the world, he knows his 
thoughts by perpetually and contingently pushing his horizon of representation *. As a point 
of view it is in essence the focal point of this expansion.  
The Anima animates both the representation that the subject has of himself and of the world, 
and a subjective time that seems to him the time of the world.  
The form time is consubstantial of meaning.  
* One would be tempted, for convenience, to say that the subject knows only past thoughts 
and events, but it would give an objective meaning to the word "past", that is, to time; in 
opposition to what we have shown. The semantic loops by which meaning exists do not 
"expend" time/object but create for themselve a present moment.         
  
  
The question of the truth and its actuality  
  
The difficulties encountered by the philosophers of the 20th  century to give a satisfactory 
definition of the concept of truth are perfectly summed up by the ref 1, so we won’t go back 
on it.  
  
Defining the truth by reference to the world always leads to a self-reference.  
To say "it is true that the snow is white because I see it white" is not satisfactory        
 To say "it is true that the snow is white because all humans see it white" is not more 
satisfactory.         
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To say "it is true that the snow is white because all the white objects that I show to a 
patient excite in his brain the same zone as the snow" does not release us more from self-
reference.         
Defining the truth of a proposition by logic is also a dead end, since it leads to a hierarchy of 
theories such as   :  
Snow is white   
The proposition "snow is white" is true      
Proof that “the proposition "snow is white" is true”      
Proof that “the proposition "the snow is white" is true" is provable         
Without ever finding a prime proposition that would not need to be proven  
  
The mode of referencing and the definition of the present moment as described in the 
preceding pages will allow us to simplify considerably this definition of truth.  
We have defined the meaning of a sign by the law of probability it contains on the appearance 
of other signs in its semantic neighbourhood.  
The concept of "snow" for example, is associated with sensations: acoustic (nëj), visual 
(white), physical (cold), emotional (pleasure), etc ...     
Each of these sensations contains in it a small probability of the other sensations and the 
concept of "snow" is nothing other than the circulation of these reciprocal probabilities.     
This reciprocal expectation between each sensation and the others is the concept of snow.  
The concept of snow is therefore not "composed" of these sensations, nor is it the "container" 
of these sensations.         
The form of the concept of snow is not in relation to those of its components  
We have seen in particular that the concept creates its own present moment.  
This circulation of probabilities is in the present time of the concept, simultaneous, without 
duration. It is therefore no longer a question of probabilities or expectations, nor of 
conjectures but of a self-determining truth, of a logical, semantic loop.  
It is not based on the truth of its semantic "components" but on the reciprocity of their 
interdependencies. Every concept is true to itself just as much as it is present to itself. In this 
truth, the truth of the sensations, signs, concepts that it unites is unimportant, only account 
their interdependence.     
 
 
This building up of truth continues throughout the merging of concepts through their 
interdependencies, up to the eternally present truth of the "I" and its representation of the 
world.     
  
Conclusion on the truth  
The Reality has no form, no truth.  
The truth of any concept is in the closed-loop circulation of interdependencies that constitutes 
it, unrelated to the truth of the concepts it unites.  
The truth of the "I", the cogito, is the asymptotic truth following this principle of union.     
  
  
The world is my representation, my representation is the world  
  
The set of logical inferences that make up the representation of the World, our theories of the 
world, efficiently anticipates our future experiences.  
On the other hand, there are reasons to doubt the existence of forms opposite, in a physical 
world.  
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The form as a reality is an improvable hypothesis while the existence of the logical link and 
its attractors is certain.  
  
So why not leave what is uncertain?  
Why not choose the most economical option in assumptions a priori ?  
Why not reverse the question of intelligibility?  
Why not replace the question: " How is the world intelligible to us ? "By the questions:" How 
does a Knowledge diffuse and structure?"; "How does it give meaning to the world?"; "How 
can it so robustly predict its own future?"  
The answer to these questions can be deduced from the preceding paragraphs:  
There is no physical world outside knowledge.  
My knowledge is not a small portion of the world that looks at the world. My knowledge is 
the world I know. My knowledge is not the state of my brain/matter determined by the 
physical world. My knowledge is not either a non-substance which, from an aether of ideas, 
would represent the substantial world.   
 
The world I know and my knowledge are one and the same thing, the same logical system.  
There is not the world on one side and its representation in my head. My knowledge is not a 
proliferation of immaterial links that extend to infinity of time and space, since in reality there 
is neither time nor space.  
There is not really an inside and an outside of me, a vast universe with me in the middle. All 
this is representation.  
It is because the reality is formless, vacant of form, that my knowledge can give it forms.  
My knowledge is not the result of an extraordinary series of chances that affected the physical 
world for 14 billion years to finally give birth to a conscious being.  
My knowledge is the laws of chance themselves, In act, which order, with my point of view 
as origin, a formless and actual All.  
There is not the laws of the world on one side and on the other side the laws of knowledge but 
one and the same law by which the world that I know takes form in my point of view.  
There is not a world that has forms and forms that my knowledge gives to it, but the same 
forms that is both the world I know and my knowledge.  
The world is not as I understand it, the world is what I understand and what I understand is for 
me the world.  
If the laws of the world prove to conform to our knowledge, both to our immediate sensations 
and to our general concepts, it is because the laws of the world are those of knowledge.  
If we can anticipate and verify by infinity of experiences what seems to us to be "the laws of 
the world", it is because the laws of knowledge, which are also the laws of the world, are 
(almost) infinitely persistent, deterministic.  
If we can exchange, from one mind to another, the same vision of the world, it is not because 
there is a same world in relation to our minds, but because firstly the laws of knowledge are 
the same for you and me and secondly because we share essentially the same interdependence 
with Reality.  
  
The future of the world is the future of knowledge:  
  
"The world is what I understand and what I understand is for me the world "  
It is not the world (in front of me) that becomes, it is my knowledge that changes its point of 
view on the world.  
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It must be understood that thought/object is neither a "state" nor a "change of state"; the 
course of thought is logical, not material.  
This logical course is that of a "point of view" that is itself logical, and it is this change of 
point of view that generates the representation of physical change.  
The change of point of view does not need anything to change, only that neighbouring logical 
links are considered as part of the Knowledge. 
Imagine a mathematician.  
He thinks his mathematical theory.  
This theory consists of theorems, themselves consisting of coherent sets of inferences.  
New inferences come to his mind: " since (E) is proven true, and since" if (E) then (F) " so 
“(F) is true" .. etc . If we admit that mathematics is true, we must admit that the inference " if 
(E) then (F) " and the proposition "(F) is true " were true before our scholar discovered them.   
Thus, the scholar's thought is diffusing into an immutable logical truth, without change of 
state. Nothing has changed in the logical reality observed by our scholar, and yet his 
representation, his knowledge has changed.  
This change is logically irreversible: what is proven true is true forever (in principle). Thus, 
the thought (that is a logical system) increases and orders itself, not physically because time 
passes, but logically because certain logical truths are dependant of his, i.e. because his truth 
unveils neighbouring thruthes.  
So our scholar's sees the time pass, although nothing changes.  
It would be useless and impossible to analyze the logical functioning of the brain of our 
scientist. Not for technical reasons, but for logical reasons that touch on the essence of the 
quantum problem: If thought (meaning) is not a state but a logical becoming, then to 
experience it, it would be necessary to change its course, that is, to destroy (stricto sensu) this 
becoming.  
  
In the ontology that we have just sketched out, to know is to become, to guide one's own 
becoming.  
The observing subject (as a logical all) is what he knows and becomes by what he observes. 
This becoming is diffusion. In the increased knowledge appear new singularities. These 
singularities are the new forms represented; their birth is irreversible, just like the 
demonstration of a theorem.  
If, therefore, the observer of an “event”, by choosing given observation means, reveals to his 
knowledge such aspect (a) rather than the complementary aspect ¬(a), it is not the course of 
reality that is affected by the observation but the course his own knowledge, his becoming 
(logical).  
The observer irreversibly directs his knowledge toward a (logical) world where this aspect (a) 
of the observed event exists and not the ¬(a) aspect.  
  
In this context, the idea of multiverse is unfounded.  
The Universe is not a thing in itself. Reality has no form. Reality is an act and does not 
become. Only thought becomes.  
The becoming of thought is individuation, there is for the "I who thinks" only one becoming 
which has sense: mine; only one universe that exists: mine and this world becomes as I 
become.  
Although quantum mechanics predicts that various possibilities occur at the microscopic 
level, there are not several possible futures at the macroscopic level. The possibility of 
another future is meaningless.  
If various possible futures befall at quantum scale, various possible pasts are as well befallen; 
since the transformations considered are reversible.  
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The individuation of my Knowledge (the convergence of the past *) compensates for its 
proliferation (the divergence of the future *) with a single future as asymptote. We find here, 
described in a new form, the principle of the Logos. The multiverse does not go to the 
macroscopic scale.  
* In reality there is neither past nor future, only what my knowledge understands and what it 
comes to understand.  
  
  
Logic as thought and as representation  
  
In his lecture, Professor Vernant sums up perfectly the efforts made by many philosophers of 
science, from Frege and Russel to the present day, to "develop a philosophical logic that 
introduces into philosophy scientific methods " allowing "to define (rigorously) concepts and 
master the rationality of inferences"  
The following sentence of Carnap sets the goal " philosophy must rely on logic to determine 
the syntax of science and any rational discourse"  
Professor Vernant's document (ref 1) is so clear that one can only recommend its direct 
reading.  
  
In the following lines we will try to show, from the conclusions drawn in the preceding 
paragraphs, that the use of logic, in spite of all its interest for the philosopher, is not a 
sufficient condition to give a rigorous meaning to a language which pretends to describe the 
world or express the thought .  
  
For that we will seize some concepts described in ref 1   :  
  
- The formal logic is extensional, it relates to objects (the proposals seen as objects) and wants 
to ignore the intension (ie the meaning of the proposals, the reference) NB: D. Vernant (ref 7) 
shows that this statement must be nuanced (without removing its relevance in the context of 
this article), in the sense that logic is only formally justified by the assumption that its objects 
are "founded”   
- Proposals must be well-formed formulas, that is to say engendrables by logical syntax.  
- There are "atomic proposals ", well-formed by definition     
- The objects are classified in a hierarchy of domains of significance or types, starting from a 
type 0 containing the individuals then a level 1 containing the classes of individuals etc.  
- The propositions are also hierarchical in semantic levels, only a superior level can refer to a 
totality of propositions of the lower level.  
- The language itself is classified in levels, starting from the object-language (ex: it snows) 
then the meta language (the proposition "it snows" is true) then a meta-meta language (the 
proposition "the proposition "it snows" is true" is semantics”).     
- In the preface written for Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Russel writes " All language ... has a 
structure about which nothing can be said in language, but there may be another language 
speaking of the first, having itself a new structure, and to this hierarchy of language there 
may be no limit " p. 26-7 ( ref 8 )     
  
All these concepts have in common to involve a relationship from the simplest to the most 
complex, from an individual to a totality, from a level of generality to the higher level.  
Each time these hierarchies presume “upward " a potential infinity, but they never question 
the existence of a first level.     
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To say that a proposition is "engendrable" postulates, however, that it can be generated in a 
finite number of inferences; otherwise, being improvable, this statement would be 
meaningless.     
The Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, having perceived this difficulty writes : " "this " is the only 
expression that makes sense by itself since it is defined as it is stated ( ref 1) ". He may have 
thought that the direct reference to the object of the world would provide a foundation for the 
logical constructions relating to reality.     
Wittgenstein is mistaken then because "this" postulates that "this exists as such", that I can 
replace "all that constitutes this" by "this". This postulate is a meta-judgment. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein did change his mind on this point to state: (ref 9)  
105 Any verification of what is admitted as true, any confirmation or denial already takes 
place within a system. And certainly this system is not a starting point more or less arbitrary 
or doubtful for our arguments; on the contrary, it belongs to the essence of what we call an 
argument. The system is not so much the starting point of arguments as their vital 
environment  
These are not isolated axioms that seem obvious to me, but a system in which consequences 
and premises are mutually supportive.  
225 What I hold firmly to it is not a proposal but a nest of proposals.  
  
Language logicians build on sand because there is no object, no being that is not, by necessity, 
the result of a meta judgment like "this exist"; for there is no being first, neither in language, 
nor in thought, nor in reality itself.  
In a logical proposition, the existential ("there is") and universal ("whatever") quantifiers, 
imply a quantification domain which is itself a set of entities (beings) whose existence as an 
entity is accepted.         
One can not prove the non-existence of being; however, all physical and thought experiments 
tending to show a "first substance" of the world, of the thought and the language have failed.  
To give a ' logician ' formulation, we say that the world is a logical equation, insoluble in its 
all. None of the logical propositions that can appear is calculable, provable going back to 
supposed first, atomic propositions.      
This incalculability of the sign is not solely related to our own limitations, the preceding 
paragraphs show that the world is essentially incalculable, without foundation, without first 
proposition.  
The absence of a foundation of the sign and thus of the thought (object) ruins in advance the 
syntactic rigor of the logic that one would like to apply to them, because without foundation 
one can not rigorously establish what " this " is, nor that " this" = " this".  
Thus (a) must be replaced by (all that {a} is) and the identity a = b replaced by (all that{a}is) 
has an equivalent in {b} and vice versa); in an infinite comparison that is therefore 
impracticable. Similarly, to express that (a) is disjoint from (b). 
How can a proposition such as a → b be qualified as "well formed" when it applies to 
sensations written {a} → {b} as discussed previously?    
     
  
Leibnitz has developed a very useful concept for figuring this problem of foundation: the 
contingent predicate to infinity. The following expression gives of this mathematical concept 
a simple definition, amusing and yet relevant: "If you play roulette indefinitely, whatever your 
initial wealth, you are ruined"  
We note that the truth value of the predicate is not defined by the initial condition but by the 
rule of the game and that, although contingent, this value of truth is incalculable, except to 
consider an actual infinity.  
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One only needs to replace the "consequence" by the "cause" (this is logically licit if the 
inferences are reciprocal) to understand that when we reference the sensation (the sign, the 
predicate) to an origin cause (the object, its qualities) we possibly do upward the symmetrical 
assumption of that Leibnitz used to do downward. We relate the predicate associated to a 
sensation to a quality that may only be “contingent to infinity”         
The reality to which to refer a sensation is therefore incalculable and the proposition "object 
copula predicate" which expresses it can not constitute a "well-formed formula".   
  
The theory of dynamic systems implements "applications" that are reversible in principle. One 
may, by reversing the inferences route, show that a sensation (considered as a final condition) 
can be connected to singularities course, to attractors/causes whose existence is only due to 
the final condition (the logical sensation/object) and to the rules of inference (the logical 
syntax) and certainly not to the reality of an "initial cause". I.e. that sensation need not to refer 
to something real.  
  
This is why the only possible reference of any representation is the knowing subject and the 
pragmatic affirmation of its existence (the cogito, a formula well-formed or not, provable or 
not).  
Any backward calculation of the logical inferences leading to my thought/subject will stop on 
a horizon of Knowledge beyond which my mind admits as "calculated" propositions, objects 
and predicates whose truth is however only singularities of the logical course.  
Any predicate of the thought or of the representation of the world will always contain a part of 
indeterminacy, not as an imperfection, but as an immanence of the Logos itself.  
  
Only mathematics can exonerate itself from this immanent indeterminacy and declare (but it 
is then a postulate) "there is something One".  
To say that logic is extensional is to postulate its foundation.  
To conceal the intentionality of propositions is a meta logical decision that is inapplicable to 
language as well as to the description of reality by the thought.  
  
Conclusion of the chapter  
To found its syntactic construction, logic postulates the possibility of atomic propositions as 
the first level of its construction.  
The philosophy of language, the ontology, except at to deny themselves, do not have this 
possibility.  
We have shown that the subject is, in essence, the only reference of any thought and of any 
representation of the world.  
We have also shown that, since the relation of knowledge to reality is unknowable, no relation 
of equivalence can be established between entities of thought/subject and reality or even of 
thought/object. Thought, knowledge, representation can not be founded. The essentially 
chaotic character of the thought, its sensitivity to initial conditions and its lack of foundation, 
make its modelling impractical by any founded system (logical, arithmetic, digital ...).  
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